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12 January 2011
[Federal Register: January 12, 2011 (Volume 76, Number 8)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 2199-2238]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr12ja11-19]
[[Page 2199]]
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Part II
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49 CFR Parts 229 and 238
Locomotive Safety Standards; Proposed Rule
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
49 CFR Parts 229 and 238
[Docket No. FR-2009-0095; Notice No. 1]
RIN 2130-AC16
Locomotive Safety Standards
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
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SUMMARY: FRA proposes to revise the existing regulations containing
Railroad Locomotive Safety Standards. The proposed revisions would
update, consolidate, and clarify the existing regulations. The proposal
incorporates existing industry and engineering best practices related
to locomotives and locomotive electronics. This includes the
development of a safety analysis for new locomotive electronic systems.
FRA believes this proposal will modernize and improve its safety
regulatory program related to locomotives.
DATES: Comments: Written comments must be received by March 14, 2011.
Comments received after that date will be considered to the extent
possible without incurring additional expenses or delays.
Hearing: FRA anticipates being able to complete this rulemaking
without a public, oral hearing. However, if FRA receives a specific
request for a public, oral hearing prior to February 11, 2011, one will
be scheduled and FRA will publish a supplemental notice in the Federal
Register to inform interested parties of the date, time, and location
of any such hearing.
ADDRESSES: Comments: Comments related to Docket No. FRA-2009-0095, may
be submitted by any of the following methods: Web Site: Federal
eRulemaking Portal, http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online
instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: 202-493-2251.
Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., W12-140, Washington, DC
20590.
Hand Delivery: Room W12-140 on the Ground level of the
West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., W12-140, Washington, DC
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting
comments.
Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and
docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this
rulemaking. Note that all comments received will be posted without
change to http://www.regulation.gov including any personal information.
Please see the Privacy Act heading in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
section of this document for Privacy Act information related to any
submitted comments or materials.
Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov at any time or to
Room W12-140 on the Ground level of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE., Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: George Scerbo, Office of Safety
Assurance and Compliance, Motive Power & Equipment Division, RRS-14,
Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC (telephone 202-493-6249), or Michael Masci, Trial
Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Federal Railroad Administration,
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC (telephone 202-493-6037).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Statutory and Regulatory Background
FRA has broad statutory authority to regulate railroad safety. The
Federal railroad safety laws (formerly the Locomotive Boiler Inspection
Act at 45 U.S.C. 22-34, repealed and recodified at 49 U.S.C. 20701-
20703) prohibit the use of unsafe locomotives and authorize FRA to
issue standards for locomotive maintenance and testing. In order to
further FRA's ability to respond effectively to contemporary safety
problems and hazards as they arise in the railroad industry, Congress
enacted the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (Safety Act) (formerly
45 U.S.C. 421, 431 et seq., now found primarily in chapter 201 of Title
49). The Safety Act grants the Secretary of Transportation rulemaking
authority over all areas of railroad safety (49 U.S.C. 20103(a)) and
confers all powers necessary to detect and penalize violations of any
rail safety law. This authority was subsequently delegated to the FRA
Administrator. (49 CFR 1.49) Until July 5, 1994, the Federal railroad
safety statutes existed as separate acts found primarily in title 45 of
the United States Code. On that date, all of the acts were repealed,
and their provisions were recodified into title 49 of the United States
Code. All references to parts and sections in this document shall be to
parts and sections located in Title 49 of the Code of Federal
Regulations.
Pursuant to its general statutory rulemaking authority, FRA
promulgates and enforces rules as part of a comprehensive regulatory
program to address the safety of, inter alia, railroad track, signal
systems, communications, rolling stock, operating practices, passenger
train emergency preparedness, alcohol and drug testing, locomotive
engineer certification, and workplace safety. In 1980, FRA issued the
majority of the regulatory provisions currently found at 49 CFR part
229 (``part 229'') addressing various locomotive related topics
including: Inspections and tests; safety requirements for brake, draft,
suspension, and electrical systems, and locomotive cabs; and locomotive
cab equipment. Since 1980, various provisions currently contained in
part 229 have been added or revised on an ad hoc basis to address
specific safety concerns or in response to specific statutory mandates.
Topics for new regulation typically arise from several sources. FRA
continually reviews its regulations and revises them as needed to
address emerging technology, changing operational realities, and to
bolster existing standards as new safety concerns are identified. It is
also common for the railroad industry to introduce regulatory issues
through FRA's waiver process. Several of FRA's proposed requirements
have been partially or previously addressed through FRA's waiver
process. As detailed in part 211, FRA's Railroad Safety Board (Safety
Board) reviews, and approves or denies, waiver petitions submitted by
railroads and other parties subject to the regulations. Petitions
granted by the Safety Board can be utilized only by the petitioning
party. By incorporating existing relevant regulatory waivers into part
229, FRA intends to extend the reach of the regulatory flexibilities
permitted under those waivers. Although, FRA is proposing to alter a
number of regulatory requirements, the comprehensive safety regulatory
structure would remain.
The requirement that a locomotive be safe to operate in the service
in which it is placed remains the cornerstone of Federal regulation.
Title 49 U.S.C. 20701 provides that ``[a] railroad carrier may use or
allow to be used a locomotive or tender on its railroad line only when
the locomotive or tender and its parts and appurtenances: (1) Are in
proper condition and safe to operate
[[Page 2201]]
without unnecessary danger of personal injury; (2) have been inspected
as required under this chapter and regulations prescribed by the
Secretary of Transportation under this chapter; and (3) can withstand
every test prescribed by the Secretary under this chapter.''
The statute is extremely broad in scope and makes clear that each
railroad is responsible for ensuring that locomotives used on its line
are safe. Even the extensive requirements of part 229 are not intended
to be exhaustive in scope, and with or without that regulatory
structure the railroads remain directly responsible for finding and
correcting all hazardous conditions. For example, even without these
proposed regulations, a railroad would be responsible for repairing an
inoperative alerter and an improperly functioning remote control
transmitter, if the locomotive is equipped with these devices.
On July 12, 2004, the Association of American Railroads (AAR), on
behalf of itself and its member railroads, petitioned the FRA to delete
the requirement contained in 49 CFR 229.131 related to locomotive
sanders. The petition and supporting documentation asserted that
contrary to popular belief, depositing sand on the rail in front of the
locomotive wheels will not have any significant influence on the
emergency stopping distance of a train. While contemplating the
petition, FRA and interested industry members began identifying other
issues related to the locomotive safety standards. The purpose of this
task was to develop information so that FRA could potentially address
the issues through the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC).
The locomotive sanders final rule was published on October 19, 2007
(72 FR 59216). FRA continued to utilize the RSAC process to address
additional locomotive safety issues. On September 10, 2009, after a
series of detailed discussions, the RSAC approved and provided
recommendations on a wide range of locomotive safety issues including,
locomotive brake maintenance, pilot height, headlight operation, danger
markings, and locomotive electronics. FRA is generally proposing the
consensus rule text for these issues with minor clarifying
modifications. The RSAC was unable to reach consensus on the issues
related to remote control locomotives, cab temperature, and locomotive
alerters. Based on its consideration of the information and views
provided by the RSAC Locomotive Safety Standards Working Group, FRA is
also proposing rule text related to the non-consensus items.
II. RSAC Overview
In March 1996, FRA established the RSAC, which provides a forum for
developing consensus recommendations on rulemakings and other safety
program issues. The Committee includes representation from interested
parties, including railroads, labor organizations, suppliers and
manufacturers, and other interested parties. A list of member groups
follows:
American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners (AARPCO)
American Association of State Highway & Transportation Officials
(AASHTO)
American Public Transportation Association (APTA)
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA)
American Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA)
Amtrak
Association of American Railroads (AAR)
Association of Railway Museums (ARM)
Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM)
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET)
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division (BMWED)
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS)
Federal Transit Administration (FTA)*
High Speed Ground Transportation Association (HSGTA)
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW)
Labor Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA)*
League of Railway Industry Women*
National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP)
National Association of Railway Business Women*
National Conference of Firemen & Oilers
National Railroad Construction and Maintenance Association
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)*
Railway Supply Institute (RSI)
Safe Travel America (STA)
Secretaria de Communicaciones y Transporte*
Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMWIA)
Tourist Railway Association Inc.
Transport Canada*
Transport Workers Union of America (TWU)
Transportation Communications International Union/BRC (TCIU/BRC)
United Transportation Union (UTU)
*Indicates associate membership.
When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to the RSAC, and after
consideration and debate, the RSAC may accept or reject the task. If
accepted, the RSAC establishes a working group that possesses the
appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop
recommendations to FRA for action on the task. These recommendations
are developed by consensus. A working group may establish one or more
task forces to develop facts and options on a particular aspect of a
given task. The task force then provides that information to the
working group for consideration. If a working group comes to unanimous
consensus on recommendations for action, the package is presented to
the RSAC for a vote. If the proposal is accepted by a simple majority
of the RSAC, the proposal is formally recommended to FRA. FRA then
determines what action to take on the recommendation. Because FRA staff
has played an active role at the working group level in discussing the
issues and options and in drafting the language of the consensus
proposal, FRA is often favorably inclined toward the RSAC
recommendation. However, FRA is in no way bound to follow the
recommendation and the agency exercises its independent judgment on
whether the recommended rule achieves the agency's regulatory goal, is
soundly supported, and is in accordance with policy and legal
requirements. Often, FRA varies in some respects from the RSAC
recommendation in developing the actual regulatory proposal. If the
working group or the RSAC is unable to reach consensus on
recommendations for action, FRA moves ahead to resolve the issue
through conventional practices including traditional rulemaking
proceedings.
III. Proceedings to Date
On February 22, 2006, FRA presented, and the RSAC accepted, the
task of reviewing existing locomotive safety needs and recommending
consideration of specific actions useful to advance the safety of rail
operations. The RSAC established the Locomotive Safety Standards
Working Group (Working Group) to handle this task and develop
recommendations for the full RSAC to consider. Members of the Working
Group, in addition to FRA, included the following:
APTA
ASLRRA
Amtrak
AAR
ASRSM
BLET
BMWE
BRS
BNSF Railway Company (BNSF)
California Department of Transportation
Canadian National Railway (CN)
Canadian Pacific Railway (CP)
Conrail
CSX Transportation (CSXT)
[[Page 2202]]
Florida East Coast Railroad
General Electric (GE)
Genesee & Wyoming Inc.
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
IBEW
Kansas City Southern Railway (KCS)
Long Island Rail Road
Metro-North Railroad
MTA Long Island
National Conference of Firemen and Oilers
Norfolk Southern Corporation (NS)
Public Service Commission of West Virginia
Rail America, Inc.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Agency
SMWIA
STV, Inc.
Tourist Railway Association Inc.
Transport Canada
Union Pacific Railroad (UP)
UTU
Volpe Center
Wabtec Corporation
Watco Companies
The task statement approved by the full RSAC sought immediate
action from the Working Group regarding the need for, and usefulness
of, the existing regulation related to locomotive sanders. The task
statement established a target date of 90 days for the Working Group to
report back to the RSAC with recommendations to revise the existing
regulatory sander provision. The Working Group conducted two meetings
that focused almost exclusively on the sander requirement. The meetings
were held on May 8-10, 2006, in St. Louis, Missouri, and on August 9-
10, 2006, in Fort Worth, Texas. Minutes of these meetings have been
made part of the docket in this proceeding. After broad and meaningful
discussion related to the potential safety and operational benefits
provided by equipping locomotives with operative sanders, the Working
Group reached consensus on a recommendation for the full RSAC.
On September 21, 2006, the full RSAC unanimously adopted the
Working Group's recommendation on locomotive sanders as its
recommendation to FRA. The next twelve Working Group meeting addressed
a wide range of locomotive safety issues. The meetings were held at the
following locations on the following days:
Kansas City, MS, October 30 & 31, 2006;
Raleigh, NC, January 9 & 10, 2007;
Orlando, FL, March 6 & 7, 2007;
Chicago, IL, June 6 & 7, 2007;
Las Vegas, NV, September 18 & 19, 2007;
New Orleans, LA, November 27 & 28, 2007;
Fort Lauderdale, FL, February 5 & 6, 2008;
Grapevine, TX, May 20 & 21, 2008;
Silver Spring, MD, August 5 & 6, 2008;
Overland Park, KS, October 22 & 23, 2008;
Washington, D.C., January 6 & 7, 2009; and
Arlington, VA, April 15 & 16, 2009.
At the above listed meetings, the Working Group successfully
reached consensus on the following locomotive safety issues: Locomotive
brake maintenance, pilot height, headlight operation, danger markings
placement, load meter settings, reorganization of steam generator
requirements, and the establishment locomotive electronics
requirements. Throughout the preamble discussion of this proposal, FRA
refers to comments, views, suggestions, or recommendations made by
members of the Working Group. When using this terminology, FRA is
referring to views, statements, discussions, or positions identified or
contained in the minutes of the Working Group meetings. These documents
have been made part of the docket in this proceeding and are available
for public inspection as discussed in the ADDRESSES portion of this
document. These points are discussed to show the origin of certain
issues and the course of discussions on those issues at the task force
or working group level. We believe this helps illuminate factors FRA
has weighed in making its regulatory decisions, and the logic behind
those decisions.
The reader should keep in mind, of course, that only the full RSAC
makes recommendations to FRA, and it is the consensus recommendation of
the full RSAC on which FRA is primarily acting in this proceeding. As
discussed above, the Working Group reported its findings and
recommendations to the RSAC at its September 10, 2009 meeting. The RSAC
approved the recommended consensus regulatory text proposed by the
Working Group, which accounts for the majority of this NPRM. The
specific regulatory language recommended by the RSAC was amended
slightly for clarity and consistency. FRA independently developed
proposals related to remote control locomotives, alerters, and
locomotive cab temperature, issues that the Working Group discussed,
but ultimately did not reach consensus.
IV. General Overview of Proposed Requirements
Trends in locomotive operation, concern about the safe design of
electronics, technology advances, and experience applying Federal
regulations provide the main impetus for the proposed revisions to
FRA's existing standards related to locomotive safety. An overview of
some of the major areas addressed in this proposal is provided below.
A. Remote Control Locomotives
Remote control devices have been used to operate locomotives at
various locations in the United States for many years, primarily within
yards and certain industrial sites. Railroads in Canada have
extensively used remote control locomotives for more than a decade. FRA
began investigating remote control operations in 1994 and held its
first public hearing on the subject in mid-1990s to gather information
and examine the safety issues relating to this new technology. On July
19, 2000, FRA conducted a technical conference in which interested
parties, including rail unions, remote control systems suppliers, and
railroad representatives, shared their views and described their
experiences with remote control operations.
On February 14, 2001, FRA published a Safety Advisory in which FRA
issued recommended guidelines for conducting remote control locomotive
operations. See 66 FR 10340, Notice of Safety Advisory 2001-01, Docket
No. FRA-2000-7325. By issuing these recommendations, FRA sought to
identify a set of ``best practices'' to guide the rail industry when
implementing this technology. As this was an emerging technology, FRA
believed the approach served the railroad industry by providing
flexibility to both manufacturers designing the equipment and to
railroads using the technology in their operations, while reinforcing
the importance of complying with all existing railroad safety
regulations. All of the major railroads have adopted the
recommendations contained in the advisory, with only slight
modifications to suit their individual operations.
In the Safety Advisory, FRA addressed the application and
enforcement of the Federal regulations to remote control locomotives.
FRA discussed the existing Federal locomotive inspection requirements
and the application of those broad requirements to remote control
locomotive technology. The Safety Advisory explains that: ``although
compliance with this Safety Advisory is voluntary, nothing in this
Safety Advisory is meant to relieve a railroad from compliance with all
existing railroad safety regulations [and] [t]herefore, when procedures
required by regulation are cited in this Safety Advisory, compliance is
mandatory.'' Id. at 10343. For example, the Safety Advisory states that
the remote control locomotive ``system must be included as part of the
calendar day inspection required by section 229.21, since this
equipment becomes an appurtenance to the locomotive.'' Id. at 10344.
Another example of a mandatory requirement mentioned in the Safety
Advisory is that the remote control locomotive ``system components that
interface with the
[[Page 2203]]
mechanical devices of the locomotive, e.g., air pressure monitoring
devices, pressure switches, speed sensors, etc., should be inspected
and calibrated as often as necessary, but not less than the
locomotive's periodic (92-day) inspection.'' Id.; see also 49 CFR
229.23. Thus, the Safety Advisory made clear that the existing Federal
regulations require inspection of the remote control locomotive
equipment.
The Safety Advisory also addressed the application of various
requirements related to the operators of remote control locomotives.
The Safety Advisory states that ``each person operating an RCL [remote
control locomotive] must be certified and qualified in accordance with
part 240 [FRA's locomotive engineer rule] if conventional operation of
a locomotive under the same circumstances would require certification
under that regulation.'' Id. at 10344. In 2006, FRA codified additional
requirements to address specific operational issues such as situational
awareness. See 71 FR 60372 (2006).
During several productive meetings, the Working Group identified
many areas of agreement regarding the regulation of remote control
locomotive equipment. On issues that produced disagreement, FRA
gathered useful information. Informed by the Working Group discussions,
this proposal would codify the industry's best practices related to the
use and operation of remote control locomotives.
B. Electronic Record-Keeping
The development and improved capability of electronic record-
keeping systems has led to the potential for safe electronic
maintenance of records required by part 229. Since April 3, 2002, FRA
has granted a series of waivers permitting electronic record-keeping
with certain conditions intended to ensure the safety, security and
accessibility of such systems. See FRA-2001-11014. Based on the
information gathered under the experiences of utilizing the electronic
records permitted under these existing waivers, the Working Group
discussed, and agreed to, generally applicable standards for electronic
record-keeping systems.
C. Brake Maintenance
Advances in technology have increased the longevity of locomotive
brake system components. In conjunction with several railroads and the
AAR, FRA has monitored the performance of new brake systems since the
Locomotive Safety Standards regulation was first published in 1980. See
45 FR 21092. The proposed revisions to locomotive air brake maintenance
are based on this extensive history of study and testing. Over the last
several decades, FRA has granted several conditional waivers extending
the air brake cleaning, repair, and test requirements of Sec. Sec.
229.27 and 229.29. These extensions were designed to accommodate
testing of the reliability of electronic brake systems and other brake
system components, with the intent of moving toward performance based
test criterion with components being replaced or repaired based upon
their reliability.
In 1981, FRA granted a test waiver (H-80-7) to eight railroads,
permitting them to extend the annual and biennial testing requirements
contained in Sec. Sec. 229.27 and 229.29, in order to conduct a study
of the safe service life and reliability of the locomotive brake
components. On January 29, 1985, FRA expanded the waiver to permit all
railroads to inspect the 26-L type brake equipment on a triennial
basis. In the 1990's, the Canadian Pacific Railroad (CP) and the
Canadian National Railroad (CN) petitioned the FRA to allow them to
operate locomotives into the United States that received periodic
attention every four years. The requests were based on a decision by
Transport Canada to institute a four-year inspection program following
a thorough test program in Canada. In November 2000, FRA granted
conditional waivers to both the CN and CP, extending the testing
interval to four years for Canadian-based locomotives equipped with 26-
L type brake systems and air dryers. The waiver also requires all air
brake filtering devices to be changed annually and the air compressor
to be overhauled not less than every six years. In 2005, this waiver
was extended industry-wide. See FRA-2005-21325.
In 2009, AAR petitioned for a waiver that would permit four year
testing and maintenance intervals for locomotives that are equipped
with 26-L type brake equipment and not equipped with air dryers. The
petition assumed that the testing and maintenance intervals that are
appropriate for locomotives equipped with air dryers are also
appropriate for locomotives without air dryers. FRA denied the request,
but granted a limited test program to determine whether the addition of
operative air dryers on a locomotive merits different maintenance and
testing requirements. FRA recognizes that the results of the test plan
may indicate that locomotives that are not equipped with air dryers
merit the same treatment as locomotives that operate without air
dryers. FRA solicits comments on this issue.
FRA also requests comments on what should constitute an operative
air dryer and how a locomotive with an inoperative air dryer should be
properly handled. FRA believes that these issues are essential to
enforcement of a requirement that includes the use of operative air
dryers. The proposed rule text does not address this issue. It is not
clear how many days an air dryer would need to stop performing to allow
contaminants in the brake line to adversely affect the brake valves to
the extent that the air dryer is no longer considered operative. It is
also unclear how many days an air dryer could be inoperative before it
needs to be repaired in order to preserve the four year testing and
maintenance schedule. FRA believes that one reasonable approach would
be to permit a locomotive with an inoperative air dryer to run to the
next periodic inspection to be repaired.
The New York Air Brake Corporation (NYAB) sought by waiver, and was
granted, an extension of the cleaning, repairing, and testing
requirements for pneumatic components of the CCBI and CCBII brake
systems (FRA-2000-7367, formerly H-95-3), and then modification of that
waiver to include its new CCB-26 electronic airbrake system. The
initial waiver, which was first granted on September 13, 1996, extended
the interval for cleaning, repairing, and testing pneumatic components
of the NYAB Computer Controlled Brake (CCB, now referred to as CCB-I)
locomotive air brake system under 49 CFR 229.27(a)(2) and 49 CFR
229.29(a) from 736 days to five years. The waiver was modified to
include NYAB's CCB-II electronic air brake system on August 20, 1998.
To confirm that the extended brake maintenance interval did not
have a negative effect on safety, FRA required quarterly reports
listing air brake failures, both pneumatic and electrical, of all
locomotives operating under the waiver including: Locomotive reporting
marks; and the cause and resolution of the problem. All verified
failures were required to be reported to FRA prior to disassembly, so
that NYAB, the railroad, and FRA could jointly witness the disassembly
of the failed component to determine the cause. The last quarterly
submission to FRA listed 1,889 CCBI and 1,806 CCBII equipped
locomotives in the United States, all of which were operating at high
levels of reliability and demonstrated safety. All past tests and
teardown inspections confirm the safety and reliability of the five
year interval.
[[Page 2204]]
Based on successful performance of the two NYAB electronic air
brake systems under the conditions of the 1996 and 1998 waivers, the
waiver was extended for another five years on September 10, 2001, and
the conditions of the waiver were modified on September 22, 2003. NYAB
described the new CCB-26 electronic air brake system as an adaptation
of the CCB-II system designed to be used on locomotives without
integrated cab electronics. It used many of the same sub-assemblies of
pneumatic valves, electronic controls and software (referred to as line
replaceable units or LRUs) as the CCB-II. Some changes were made to
simplify the system while maintaining or increasing the level of
safety. For example, the penalty brake interface was changed to mimic
the 26L system interface, allowing for a fully pneumatic penalty brake
application. Also, the brake cylinder pilot pressure development has
been simplified from an electronic control to a fully pneumatic version
based on proven components.
Much of the software and diagnostic logic which detects critical
failures and takes appropriate action to effect a safe stop has been
carried over from CCB-II. Overall, NYAB characterized the CCB-26 as
being more similar to CCB-II than CCB-II is to CCB-I. As a final check
on the performance of the CCB-26 system, it was included in the
existing NYAB failure monitoring and recording systems. For the reasons
above, FRA extended the waiver of compliance with brake maintenance
requirements to locomotives equipped with CCB-26 brake systems.
Similarly, WABCO Locomotive Products (WABCO), a Wabtec company,
sought and was granted an extension of the cleaning, repairing, and
testing requirements for pneumatic components of the EPIC brake systems
(FRA-2002-13397, formerly H-92-3), and then modification of that waiver
to include its new FastBrake line of electronic airbrake systems. The
initial waiver conditionally extended to five years the clean, repair
and test intervals for certain pneumatic air brake components contained
in Sec. Sec. 229.27(a)(2) and 229.29(a) for WABCO's EPIC electronic
air brake equipment. WABCO complied with all of the conditions of the
waiver. Specifically, WABCO provided regular reports to FRA including
summaries of locomotives equipped with EPIC brake systems and all
pneumatic and electronic failures. FRA participated in two joint
teardown inspections of EPIC equipment after five years of service in
June 2000 and May 2002. After five years of service, the EPIC brake
systems were found to function normally. No faults were found during
locomotive tests, and the teardown revealed that the parts were clean
and in working condition.
In support of its proposal to extend brake maintenance for
FastBrake brake systems, WABCO stated that virtually all of the core
pneumatic technology that has been service proven in EPIC from the time
of its introduction and documented as such under the provisions of the
above waiver and were transferred into FastBrake with little or no
change. They asserted that a further reduction of pneumatic logic
devices had been made possible by the substitution of compute based
logic. WABCO also provided a discussion of the similarities between the
EPIC and FastBrake systems as well as the differences, which are
primarily in the area of electronics rather than pneumatics. In
conclusion, WABCO stated that the waiver could be amended without
compromising safety. For the reasons above, FRA granted the waiver
petition.
Over time, several brake systems have been brought into a
performance based standard. FRA, along with railroads and brake valve
manufacturers, has participated in a series of brake valve evaluations.
Each evaluation was performed after extended use of a particular brake
valve system to determine whether it can perform safely when used
beyond the number of days currently permitted by part 229. The Working
Group agreed with the evidence of success and the overall approach
taken by FRA. As a result, the Working Group reached consensus on the
proposed brake maintenance standards.
D. Brakes, General
In December of 1999, a MP&E Technical Resolution Committee (TRC),
consisting of FRA and industry experts, met in Kansas City to consider
the proper application of the phrase ``operate as intended'' contained
in Sec. 229.46 when applied to trailing, non-controlling locomotives.
Extensive discussion failed to reach consensus on this issue, but
revealed valuable insight into the technical underpinnings and
operational realities surrounding the issue. The Working Group revived
this issue, and after lengthy discussion, reached consensus.
Generally, even if a locomotive has a defective brake valve that
prevents it from functioning as a lead locomotive, its brakes will
still properly apply and release when it is placed and operated as a
trailing locomotive. This situation can apply on either a pneumatic 26-
L application or on the electronic versions of the locomotive brake.
The electronic brake often will have the breaker turned off, thus
making the brake inoperative unless it is being controlled by another
locomotive.
Based on reading the plain language of the existing regulation it
is not clear under what conditions a trailing, non-controlling
locomotive operates as intended. The existing regulation provides that
``the carrier shall know before each trip that the locomotive brakes
and devices for regulating all pressures, including but not limited to
the automatic and independent brake valves, operate as intended * * *''
See 49 CFR 229.46. One could reasonably argue that a trailing non-
controlling locomotive is operating as intended when the brakes are
able to apply and release in response to a command from a controlling
locomotive, because the locomotive is not intended to control the
brakes when it is used in the trailing position. It could also be
argued that the trailing, non-controlling locomotive's automatic and
independent brake valves must be able to control the brakes whenever it
is called on to do so. Under this reading, a trailing, non-controlling
locomotive does not operate as intended when it is not able to control
the brakes.
At the TRC meeting, the representatives from NYAB Corporation, a
brake manufacturer, asserted that a problem with a faulty automatic or
independent brake valve will not create an unsafe condition when the
locomotive is operating in the trail position, provided the locomotive
consist has a successful brake test (application and release) from the
lead unit. The reason offered was that in order for a locomotive to
operate in the trailing position, the automatic and independent brake
valves must be cut-out. FRA agrees, and currently applies this
rationale in regards to performing a calendar day inspection. The
calendar day inspection does not require that the operation of the
automatic and independent brake controls be verified on trailing
locomotives. The Working Group agreed, and recommended adding a tagging
requirement to prevent a trailing, non-controlling locomotive with
defective independent or automatic brakes from being used as a
controlling locomotive.
E. Locomotive Cab Temperature
In 1998, FRA led an RSAC Working Group to address various cab
working condition issues. To aid the Working Group discussions, FRA
conducted a study to determine the average temperature in each type of
locomotive cab commonly used at the time. The
[[Page 2205]]
study concluded that at the location where the engineer operates the
locomotive, each locomotive maintained an average temperature of at
least 60 degrees. The window and door gaskets were maintained in proper
condition on the locomotives that were studied. In 1998, FRA believed
it was impractical to address the minimum temperature issue by
regulation, especially given that, the existing industry practice was
appropriate and revision of the regulation would have required
considerable resources. Now that the locomotive safety standards are in
the process of being revised, FRA proposes to incorporate existing
industry practice into the regulation in an effort to maintain the
current conditions. For review, the 1998 study has been included in the
public docket related to this proceeding.
In addition to proposing an increase in the minimum cab temperature
from 50 [deg]F to 60 [deg]F, FRA believes that establishing a maximum
cab temperature limit would result in improved locomotive crew
performance, which in turn would increase railroad safety. Current
literature regarding the effect of low temperature on human performance
indicates that performance decreases when the temperature decreases
below 60 [deg]F. Similarly, the literature regarding the effect of high
temperature and humidity indicates that performance decreases when
temperatures increase above 80[deg] F, and that performance decreases
to an even greater extent when the temperature increases above 90
[deg]F. Ergonomics, 2002 vol. 45, no. 10, 682-698.
Locomotive crew performance is directly linked to railroad safety
through the safe operation of trains. Locomotive engineers are
responsible for operating trains in a safe and efficient manner. This
requires the performance of cognitive tasks including the mathematical
information processing required for train handling, constant vigilance,
and accurate perception of the train and outside environment.
Conductors are responsible for maintaining accurate train consists,
including the contents and position of hazardous materials cars, for
confirming the aspects and indications of signals, and for ensuring
compliance with written orders and instructions. A decrease in
performance of any of these tasks that can be anticipated from relevant
scientific findings should be avoided where amelioration can be
applied.
In the Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) literature, stressors are
considered to be important factors that can affect human performance
and produce errors. Such stressors are, in fact, labeled performance-
shaping factors (PSFs) and include external (or environmental) factors
such as temperature. In general, if one has an estimate of the human
error probability (HEP) associated with some generic or specific task,
the PSFs that exist are used to modulate the magnitude of that error.
For example, an estimate of HEP associated with simple calculations is
0.04, with a lower bound of 0.02 and an upper bound of 0.11. If stress
is introduced in a situation in which there is decision-making and
multi-tasking (all of which are typical of locomotive engineer work),
human factor experts recommend that HEP be increased five-fold for
skilled workers and ten-fold for novice workers. Consequently, mean HEP
would be estimated at 0.2 for skilled workers and at 0.4 for novices.
This same logic can be applied to estimate accident reduction. Accident
reduction estimates can be obtained under the assumption that accidents
are proportional to the task performance decrements that accrue due to
temperature stress. If a proportion of the task performance decrements
is eliminated, then accidents should also be proportionately decreased.
For example, in 1999, 16 of the human factors train accidents reported
to the FRA occurred when the ambient temperatures were 90 [deg]F or
above. Conservatively assuming that at least eight (50 percent) of the
locomotive cabs did not have operational air conditioning or other
measures in place to reduce in cab temperatures below the ambient
temperature and applying the overall task decrement of 0.148 as
described in the meta-analysis an estimate may be made that a 65/86
temperature rule would prevent more than one in eight of the 1999 human
factors train accidents that occurred when ambient and in cab
temperatures were 90 [deg]F or above. The results of applying task
decrements to human factors train accidents in specific temperature
ranges, however, can be considered conservative because the accidents
considered only include accidents for which the primary cause was
identified as ``Human Factors.'' Experts on accident causation indicate
that accidents very rarely have a single cause. Rather, there are
usually multiple factors that together contribute to the generation of
an accident.
In many occupational settings it is desirable to minimize the
health and safety effects of temperature extremes. Depending upon the
workplace, engineering controls may be employed as well as the
management of employee exposure to excess cold or heat using such
methods as work-rest regimens. Because of the unique nature of the
railroad operating environment, the locomotive cab can be viewed as a
captive workplace where the continuous work of the locomotive crew
takes place in a relatively small space. For this reason, in an
excessively hot cab, a locomotive crew member may have no escape from
extreme temperatures, since they cannot be expected to readily
disembark the train and rest in a cooler environment as part of a work-
rest regimen without prior planning by the railroad. As such, FRA
expects reliance upon engineering controls to limit temperature
extremes. When FRA considered controls for cold and hot temperature cab
environments, FRA learned that there is a range of engineering controls
available that can be employed. Some of these controls are presently
employed to affect the cab temperature environment. Controls include
isolation from heat sources such as the prime mover; reduced emissivity
of hot surfaces; insulation from hot or cold ambient environments;
radiation shielding including reflective shields, absorptive shielding,
transparent shielding, and flexible shielding; localized workstation
heating or cooling; general and spot (fan) ventilation; evaporative
cooling; chilled coil cooling systems.
As noted above, in 1998, FRA led an RSAC Working Group to address
various cab working condition issues. To aid the Working Group
discussions, FRA conducted a winter time study to determine the average
low temperature in each type of locomotive cab commonly used at the
time. The study concluded that at the location where the engineer
operates the locomotive, each locomotive maintained an average
temperature of at least 60 [deg]F. Ergonomics, 2002 vol. 45, no. 10,
682-698. The window and door gaskets were maintained in proper
condition on the locomotives that were studied. In 1998, FRA believed
it was impractical to address the minimum temperature issue by
regulation, especially given that, the existing industry practice was
appropriate and revision of the regulation would have required
considerable resources. Now that the locomotive safety standards are in
the process of being revised, FRA proposes to incorporate existing
industry practice into the regulation in an effort to maintain the
current minimum cab temperature conditions.
Based on the preceding discussion and its review of existing
literature on the subject, FRA believe it is appropriate to consider
not only
[[Page 2206]]
limiting minimum locomotive cab temperature but also limiting maximum
locomotive cab temperature. FRA believes that an appropriate maximum
temperature level for a locomotive cab is a wet bulb temperature (WBT)
somewhere between 80[deg] and 90 [deg]F. FRA recognizes that the
mechanical capabilities of cooling systems on both existing and new
locomotives are directly affected by the outside ambient temperature.
Thus, FRA expects that the maximum cab temperature limit may need to be
flexible in extreme weather conditions due to the limited ability of
existing cooling systems to produce a temperature a vast number of
degrees cooler than the external ambient temperature. FRA seeks comment
and information from interested parties regarding current practices
within the industry with regard to maintaining a maximum locomotive cab
temperature.
There are a number of factors and issues that must be considered
when imposing a maximum locomotive cab temperature. In an effort to
develop safe and cost-effective requirements related to establishing a
maximum locomotive cab temperature limit FRA seeks comments from
interested parties on the following issues:
1. To what locomotives should the maximum cab temperature limits apply?
FRA does not anticipate applying the maximum cab temperature limit
to all locomotives. Existing locomotives that are not equipped with air
conditioners would not be required to add air conditioning units. A
significant portion of the industry's existing locomotive fleet is
currently equipped with air conditioners. FRA believes that air
conditioning units should remain on locomotives that are currently so
equipped and would expect the maximum cab temperature limit to apply to
such units. FRA also expects that the maximum temperature limit would
be applicable to new locomotives, and remanufactured locomotives as
defined in Sec. 229.5. FRA believes that one of the reasons that
virtually all of these types of locomotives are constructed with air
conditioning units in order to ensure the proper operation of the on-
board electronic equipment. Thus, the locomotives are already equipped
with the facilities to maintain a cab temperature below the maximum
temperatures being contemplated. FRA also recognizes that at some
locations the ambient temperature may seldom or never rise above 90
[deg]F. Thus, FRA is considering an approach that might provide an
exception for these types of locations from the maximum cab temperature
limits. With the above discussion in mind, FRA seeks information and
comments from interested parties on the following:
What percentage of locomotives in the existing fleet are
equipped with air conditioning units?
What percentages of newly constructed or remanufactured
locomotives are equipped with air conditioning units?
What potential requirements could apply to locomotives
that spend the majority of their time in locations that rarely rise
above 90 [deg]F, but also operate in locations where the temperature
does rise above 90 [deg]F?
How could these locations be properly excluded from the
maximum temperature requirements?
Are there technologies other than air conditioning units
that could be utilized in these types of locations?
2. What are the capabilities of existing locomotive cab air
conditioning units?
Although FRA has not conducted tests to determine the effectiveness
of air conditioning systems, FRA's knowledge of HVAC capabilities and
experience riding locomotives with operative air conditioning units
indicates that such systems can hold cab temperatures below 90 [deg]F
under expected service conditions when properly maintained, as is the
case with rail passenger coaches, passenger MU locomotives, motorized
vehicles on the highway, and other means of conveyance. However, FRA
recognizes that existing air conditioners have technical limitations,
and that those limitations need to be considered when developing a
maximum cab temperature requirement. FRA seeks comment and information
on the following:
At what rate can air conditioning units currently being
used within the industry cool the interior of a locomotive cab?
What external conditions or factors affect an air
conditioning unit's ability to reduce the interior locomotive cab
temperature?
Would it be possible to modify an existing air
conditioning unit or interior of the locomotive cab to address the
conditions noted above?
3. What is the appropriate method for measuring maximum locomotive cab
temperature?
An effective and reliable method for measuring the maximum
locomotive cab temperature will need to be included in the final rule
in order to make any maximum temperature requirement enforceable.
Railroad management, train crews, and FRA will need to be able to
accurately measure the maximum cab temperature when a locomotive is in
use. The existing and proposed minimum locomotive cab temperature
requirement provides that the temperature be measured six inches above
each seat in the cab. FRA believes that a similar location for
measuring the maximum temperature would appear to be appropriate. FRA
also recognizes that any cooling system will require a sufficient
amount of time to adequately reduce the interior temperature of a
locomotive cab. Thus, the ability to test or measure the temperature
may not occur until a locomotive is already in use. In consideration of
the above, FRA seeks comment and information from interested parties on
the following:
How do railroads currently measure or monitor locomotive
cab temperatures to comply with the existing minimum temperature
requirements?
Do railroads measure cab temperature for other purposes?
If so, what are those purposes?
Could the same methods be used to monitor a maximum
temperature requirement?
Are there locations where testing or monitoring of air
conditioning units would be extremely burdensome or impossible?
The existing minimum cab temperature requirement is based
on measurement of the temperature six inches above each seat in the
cab. Would that also be an appropriate location in the cab to measure
temperature to determine compliance with a maximum temperature
requirement?
Is there an appropriate frequency at which air
conditioning units should be tested?
4. How should locomotive air conditioning units be maintained and
repaired when found defective or inoperative?
In order to ensure that locomotives to which the maximum cab
temperature limits would apply are generally capable of compliance, the
final rule would need to contain basic inspection, maintenance, and
repair provisions related to on-board cooling systems. FRA recognizes
that these maintenance and repair schedules and requirements would be
most applicable during those annual periods where extreme hot weather
is prevalent across most of the continental United States. Thus, FRA
expects to concentrate such provisions during these vital time periods.
Similarly, FRA recognizes that appropriate provisions related to the
handling and use of a locomotive with an inoperative cooling system
would
[[Page 2207]]
need to be provided. Under the existing part 229 movement for repair
provisions, if a locomotive were required to meet a maximum cab
temperature limit and was found unable to do so, then the locomotive
could only be moved to the next forward location or to its next
calendar day inspection where necessary repairs to the locomotive's
cooling system could be performed. FRA realizes such a stringent
requirement might unduly hinder a railroad's ability to operate trains
or have sufficient locomotive power in certain locations. With the
foregoing discussion in mind, FRA seeks comments from interested
parties on the following:
How frequently do railroads currently inspect locomotive
air conditioning units for proper operation?
What would an appropriate interval for testing and
maintaining locomotive equipped with air conditioning units?
What movement or use restrictions should be applied to a
locomotive equipped with an air conditioning unit when discovered with
a cab temperature that exceeds the maximum limit?
What maintenance or repair requirements would be
appropriate if a lead/occupied locomotive has an air conditioning unit
fail en route, when the ambient temperature exceeds a regulatory
requirement?
What maintenance or repair requirements would be
appropriate if an air conditioning unit in a lead or occupied
locomotive is found to be inoperative or operating insufficiently at
pre-departure (after the train has been made up and the air-brake test
has been performed)?
Should consistent management be a factor for determining
when an inoperative air conditioning unit will properly be repaired or
switched out? Why or why not?
5. What are the potential costs of complying with a maximum locomotive
cab temperature limit as described in the preceding discussions?
The cost implications of this proposal will depend on various
factors, including temperature requirements, maintenance requirements,
repair procedures, and the treatment of existing locomotives already
equipped with air conditioning units. The regulatory burden may result
from equipping new and remanufactured locomotives with air conditioning
units. However, because most, if not all, new locomotives are currently
purchased with air conditioning units already installed, the burden
would likely come from the testing and maintenance, including repair,
of air conditioning units.
FRA estimates that the railroad industry purchases approximately
600-700 new locomotives a year. Most of the new locomotives are
purchased by Class I freight railroads. Other railroads such as Alaska
Railroad, Amtrak, and some commuter railroads also purchase new
locomotives. Generally, FRA does not anticipate that Class III
railroads will purchase new locomotives, and thereby, be affected by
this proposal in the immediate or near future. FRA is considering
requiring air conditioning units on only new or remanufactured
locomotives. FRA believes that most, if not all, new and remanufactured
locomotives are manufactured with air conditioning units, and most
locomotives that receive life extending modifications are also likely
equipped. FRA requests information regarding the specifications for air
conditioning units currently installed on new, remanufactured, and
overhauled locomotives. Specifically, FRA seeks information regarding
temperature and humidity capabilities. FRA also seeks information
regarding the tolerances of the units in the locomotive running
environment, which may include over 12 hours of continuous operation at
high temperature and humidity levels. To the extent that new
locomotives are already equipped with air conditioning units that can
function well in the environment in which they operate, there would be
little or no additional regulatory cost associated with the basic
requirement to equip new locomotives with such units.
Requirements for periodic testing of air conditioning units could
also add regulatory cost. FRA believes that most railroads are
prudently testing the air conditioning units on their locomotives
annually or periodically at shorter intervals. These tests are most
likely conducted when the locomotive is already out of service for a 92
day inspection. FRA requests information on the frequency of testing
and the cost associated with conducting the tests. Requirements for
repairing air conditioning units could also add regulatory cost. In
order to develop a cost analysis of the maintenance and repairs that
would be needed to properly utilize the AC units, FRA requests
information regarding the frequency of air conditioning failures and
the nature of common defects as well as the costs associated with
making the repairs. FRA also requests information regarding reasonable
ways to address air conditioning units that are discovered defective
outside of the maintenance window. FRA estimates that an air
conditioning unit has a life-cycle of 8 and 10 years. The cost for
testing and repairing air conditioning units on locomotives is most
likely the highest cost element of this proposal. However, the
potential regulatory cost for such a proposal would depend on the
actual requirement that is promulgated. The cost would increase if a
lead locomotive is required to be switched out after the initial air-
brake test, or if the AC unit on the lead locomotive failed en route.
FRA seeks information and comments on the following issues related
to costs:
What are the costs associated with increased maintenance
and modifications to locomotive equipped with air conditioning units to
ensure they operate as intended?
What would be the expected costs to equip new and
remanufactured locomotives with air conditioners that are capable of
satisfying the type of maximum temperature limit discussed above?
How many new locomotives are currently equipped with air
conditioning units?
What operational burdens would be placed on the industry
should a maximum cab temperature limit be included in the final rule?
F. Headlights
The proposed revisions to the headlight provisions would
incorporate waiver FRA 2005-23107 into part 229. This would permit a
locomotive with one failed 350-watt incandescent lamp to operate in the
lead until the next daily inspection, if the auxiliary lights remain
continuously illuminated. Currently, a headlight with only one
functioning 200-watt lamp is not defective and does not affect the
permissible movement of a locomotive. However, a locomotive with only
one functioning 350-watt lamp in the headlight can be moved only
pursuant to section 229.9. The proposed treatment of locomotives with a
failed 350-watt lamp would allow flexibility, and be consistent with
the current treatment of 200-watt lamps.
Testing showed that production tolerances for the 350-watt
incandescent lamp cause most individual lamps to fall below the 200,000
candela requirement at the center of the beam. As such, two working
350-watt lamps are required to ensure 200,000 candela at the center of
the beam. Testing also showed that the 350-watt incandescent lamp
produced well over 100,000 candela at the center of the beam, and its
high power and the position of the filament within the reflector causes
the lamp to be brighter than the 200-watt
[[Page 2208]]
incandescent lamp at all angles greater than approximately 2.5 degrees
off the centerline. In other words, the only area in which the 350-watt
lamp produces insufficient illumination is within 2.5 degrees of the
centerline. The proposed requirement would compensate for the reduced
amount of illumination by requiring the auxiliary lights to be aimed
parallel to the centerline of the locomotive and illuminate
continuously.
Significantly, in 1980, when FRA promulgated the 200,000 candela
requirement it could not take into consideration the light produced by
auxiliary lights, because they were not required and not often used.
Today, there is light in front of a locomotive produced by both the
headlight and the auxiliary lights. When discussing AAR's request that
the final rule permit locomotives with a nonfunctioning 350-watt lamp
to operate without restriction, FRA stated that AAR's comments ``may
have merit when considering locomotives with auxiliary lights aimed
parallel to the centerline of the locomotive.'' See 69 FR 12533. While
the auxiliary lights on some locomotives are aimed parallel to the
centerline, on many others the auxiliary lights are aimed so that their
light will cross 400 feet in front of the locomotive. The regulations
only require auxiliary lights to be aimed within 15 feet of the
centerline. FRA is not aware of a basis for assuming that the light
from two auxiliary lights complying with the regulations in any fashion
would be insufficient, when combined with a 350-watt headlight lamp.
G. Alerters
Alerters are a common safety device intended to verify that the
locomotive engineer remains capable and vigilant to accomplish the
tasks that he or she must perform. An alerter will initiate a penalty
brake application to stop the train if it does not receive the proper
response from the engineer. As an appurtenance to the locomotive, an
alerter must operate as intended when present on a locomotive. Section
20701 of Title 49 of the United States Code prohibits the use of a
locomotive unless the entire locomotive and its appurtenances are in
proper condition and safe to operate in the service to which they are
placed. Under this authority, FRA has issued many violations against
railroads for operating locomotives equipped with a non-functioning
alerter.
Alerters are currently required on passenger locomotives by Sec.
238.237 (67 FR 19991 (2002)), and are present on most freight
locomotives. A long-standing industry standard currently contains more
stringent requirements than provisions being proposed in this document.
See AAR Standard S-5513, ``Locomotive Alerter Requirements,'' (November
26, 2007).
After several productive meetings, the Working Group reached
partial consensus on requirements related to the regulation of
alerters. For those areas where agreement could not be reached, FRA has
fully considered the information and views of the Working Group members
in developing the proposed requirements related to locomotive alerters.
The proposed provisions also take into consideration recommendations
made by the NTSB.
On July 10, 2005, at about 4:15 a.m., two Canadian National (CN)
freight trains collided head-on in Anding, Mississippi. The collision
occurred on the CN Yazoo Subdivision, where the trains were being
operated under a centralized traffic control signal system on single
track. Signal data indicated that the northbound train, IC 1013 North,
continued past a stop (red) signal at North Anding and collided with
the southbound train, IC 1023 South, about \1/4\ mile beyond the
signal. The collision resulted in the derailment of six locomotives and
17 cars. Approximately 15,000 gallons of diesel fuel were released from
the locomotives and resulted in a fire that burned for roughly 15
hours. Two crewmembers were on each train; all four were killed. As a
precaution, about 100 Anding residents were evacuated; fortunately,
they did not report any injuries. Property damages exceeded $9.5
million and clearing and environmental cleanup costs totaled
approximately $616,800.
The NTSB has issued a series of safety recommendations that would
require freight locomotives to be equipped with an alerter. On April
25, 2007, the NTSB determined that a contributing cause of the head-on
collision in Anding, Mississippi was the lack of an alerter on the lead
locomotive, which if present, could have prompted the crew to be more
attentive to their operation of the train. See Recommendation R-07-1.
That recommendation provides as follows: ``[r]equire railroads to
ensure that the lead locomotives used to operate trains on tracks not
equipped with a positive train control system are equipped with an
alerter.''
Another NTSB recommendation relating to locomotive alerters was
issued as a result of an investigation into the collision of two
Norfolk Southern Railway freight trains at Sugar Valley, Georgia, on
August 9, 1990. In that incident, the crew of one of the trains failed
to stop at a signal. The NTSB concluded that the engineer of that train
was probably experiencing a micro-sleep or was distracted. Based on
testing, it was determined that as the train approached the stop
signal, the alerter would have initiated an alarm cycle. The NTSB
concluded that the engineer ``could have cancelled the alerter system
while he was asleep by a simple reflex action that he performed without
conscious thought.'' As a result of the investigation, the NTSB made
the following recommendation FRA: ``[i]n conjunction with the study of
fatigue of train crewmembers, explore the parameters of an optimum
alerter system for locomotives. See NTSB Recommendation R-91-26.
Typically, alerter alarms occur more frequently as train speed
increases. Unlike the Sugar Valley, Georgia, accident in which the
train had slowed and entered a siding before overrunning a signal, the
northbound train in the Anding, Mississippi, remained on the main track
at higher speeds. Had an alerter been installed, there was a four
minute time period after passing the approach signal during which the
alerter would have activated four to five times. It seems unlikely that
the engineer could have reset the alerter multiple times by reflex
action without any increase in his awareness. Therefore, the NTSB
determined that an alerter likely would have detected the lack of
activity by the engineer and sounded an alarm that could have alerted
one or both crewmembers. Had the crew been incapacitated or not
responded to the alarm, the alerter would have automatically applied
the brakes and brought the train to a stop. The NTSB concluded that had
an alerter been installed on the lead locomotive of the northbound
train, it may have prevented the collision.
The NTSB also closely examined the use of locomotive alerters when
investigating the sideswipe collision between two Union Pacific
Railroad (UP) freight trains in Delia, Kansas, on July 2, 1997. In that
accident, a train entered a siding but did not stop at the other end,
and it collided with a passing train on the main track. The NTSB
concluded that ``had the striking locomotive been equipped with an
alerter, it may have helped the engineer stay awake while his train
traveled through the siding.'' As a result of its investigation, the
NTSB made the following recommendation to the FRA: ``[r]evise the
Federal regulations to require that all locomotives operating on lines
that do not have a positive train separation system be equipped with a
cognitive alerter system that cannot be
[[Page 2209]]
reset by reflex action.'' See NTSB Recommendation R-99-53.
FRA believes that the proposed provisions related to alerters
incorporate existing railroad practices and locomotive design and
address each of the NTSB recommendations discussed above.
F. Locomotive Electronics
After extensive discussion, the Working Group reached consensus on
the proposed requirements related to locomotive electronic systems.
Advances in electronics and software technology have resulted in
changes to the implementation of locomotive control systems. Technology
changes have allowed the introduction of new functional capabilities as
well as the integration of different functions in ways that advance the
building, operation, and maintenance of locomotive control systems. FRA
encourages the use of these advanced technologies to improve safe,
efficient, and economical operations. However, the increased
complexities and interactions associated with these technologies
increase the potential for unintentional and unplanned consequences,
which could adversely affect the safety of rail operations.
The proposed regulation would prescribe safety standards for
safety-critical electronic locomotive control systems, subsystems, and
components including requirements to ensure that the development,
installation, implementation, inspection, testing, operation,
maintenance, repair, and modification of those products will achieve
and maintain an acceptable level of safety. This proposal would also
prescribe standards to ensure that personnel working with safety-
critical products receive appropriate training. Of course, each
railroad would be able to prescribe additional or more stringent rules,
and other special instructions, provided they are consistent with the
proposed standards.
FRA also recognizes that advances in technology may further
eliminate the traditional distinctions between locomotive control and
train control functionalities. Indeed, technology advances may provide
for opportunities for increased or improved functionalities in train
control systems that run concurrent with locomotive control. Train
control and locomotive control, however, remain two fundamentally
different operations with different objectives. FRA does not want to
restrict the adoption of new locomotive control functions and
technologies by establishing regulations for locomotive control systems
intended to address safety issues associated with train control.
G. Periodic Locomotive Inspection
The Locomotive Safety Standards Working Group was unable to reach
consensus on whether current locomotive inspection intervals and
procedures are appropriate to current conditions. Recently, on June 22,
2009, FRA granted the Burlington Northern Santa Fe's (BNSF) request for
waiver from compliance with the periodic locomotive inspection
requirements. See Docket FRA-2008-0157. BNSF stated in their request
that each of the subject locomotives are equipped with new self-
diagnostic technology and advanced computer control, and that the
locomotives were designed by the manufacturer to be maintained at a six
month interval.
In the waiver petition, BNSF requested that the required 92-day
periodic inspection be performed at 184 day intervals on subject
locomotives, if qualified mechanical forces perform at least one of the
required daily inspections every 31 days and FRA non-complying
conditions that are discovered en-route or during any daily inspection
are moved to a mechanical facility capable of making required repairs.
This approach to conducting inspections based on current conditions may
be suitable to other similarly situated railroads. FRA seeks comment on
this issue.
H. Rear End Markers
In 2003, the U.S. DOT's Office of Governmental Affairs received a
letter from Senator Feinstein on behalf of her constituent, Mr. David
Creed. Mr. Creed suggested a revision to FRA's rear end marker
regulation, which is found in part 221. Specifically, Mr. Creed
suggested that Federal regulations should require trains with
distributive power on the rear to have a red marker, because a red
marker would make for a safer operating environment by giving a rail
worker a better indication of whether he or she is looking at the rear
or front end of the train. Mr. Creed made reference to a recent
fatality involving a BNSF conductor who jumped from his train because
he observed a headlight that he mistakenly believed was a train on the
same track, directly ahead of his train. As FRA is currently reviewing
its existing requirements for locomotive safety standards, FRA requests
comments on this rear end marker issue.
I. Locomotive Horn
FRA solicits comments regarding methods currently being used by
railroads to test locomotive horns as required by Sec. 229.129. More
than one method of testing will satisfy the current testing
requirements. FRA is considering whether certain current methods of
testing should be preferred, or additional methods should be permitted.
J. Risk Analysis Standardization and Harmonization
FRA has been actively implementing, whenever practical, performance
regulations based on the management of risk. In the process of doing
so, a number of different system safety requirements, each unique to a
particular regulation, have been promulgated. While this approach is
consistent with the widely, and deeply, held conviction that risk
management efforts should be specifically tailored for individual
situations, it has resulted in confusion regarding the applicable
regulatory requirements. This, in turn has defeated one of the primary
objectives of using performance based regulations, reduction in costs
from simplifying regulations.
The problem is not the concept of tailoring, but the lack of
standard terms, basic tools, and techniques. Numerous directives,
standards, regulations, and regulatory guides establish the authority
for system safety engineering requirements in the acquisition,
development, and maintenance of hardware and software-based systems.
The lack of commonality makes extremely difficult the task of training
system safety personnel, evaluating and comparing programs, and
effectively monitoring and controlling system safety efforts for the
railroads, their vendors, and the government. Even though tailoring
will continue to be an important system safety concept, at some point
FRA believes the proliferation of techniques, worksheets, definitions,
formats, and approaches has to end, or at least some common ground has
to be established.
To accomplish this, FRA proposes to harmonize risk management
process requirements across all regulations that have been promulgated
by the agency. This will implement a systematic approach to hardware
and software safety analysis as an integral part of a project's overall
system safety program for protecting the public, the worker, and the
environment. Harmonization enhances compliance and improves the
efficiency of the transportation system by minimizing the regulatory
burden. Harmonization also facilitates interoperability among products
and systems, which benefits all stakeholders. By overcoming
institutional and financial barriers to
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technology harmonization, stakeholders could realize lower life-cycle
costs for the acquisition and maintenance of systems. To this end, FRA
requests comments on appropriate, cost effective, performance based
standards containing precise criteria to be used consistently as rules,
guidelines, or definitions of characteristics, to ensure that
materials, products, processes and services are fit for purpose, and
present an acceptable level of risk that are applicable across all
elements of the railroad industry.
K. MCB Contour 1904 Coupler
FRA believes that the existing requirement related to MCB contour
1904 couplers, contained in Sec. 229.61(a)(1), is out dated. The
existing regulation prohibits the use of a MCB contour 1904 coupler, if
the distance between the guard arm and the knuckle nose is more than 5
\1/8\ inches. FRA understands that the MCB contour 1904 coupler design
has not been used in the railroad industry since the 1930s. Most, if
not all, of the current locomotive fleet are equipped with Type E
couplers. For these couplers, the maximum distance permitted between
the guard arm and the knuckle nose is 5 \5/16\ inches, as identified in
Sec. 229.61(a)(1). FRA seeks comments as to whether any locomotives
are currently being operated with MCB contour 1904 couplers, and
whether the requirement related to MCB contour 1904 couplers should be
removed from the locomotive safety standards.
L. Locomotive Cab Securement
FRA is evaluating securement options for locomotive cab doors. Cab
securement can potentially prevent unauthorized access to the
locomotive cab, and thereby increase train crew safety. However, cab
securement demands a careful and balanced approach because when
emergencies requiring emergency egress or rescue access occur,
securement systems must not hinder rapid and easy egress by train crews
or access by emergency responders without undue delay. FRA is exploring
how to achieve greater safety by properly balancing these concerns.
On June 20, 2010, a CSX Conductor was shot and killed in the cab of
the controlling locomotive of his standing train in New Orleans, during
an attempted robbery. The Locomotive Engineer assigned to that train
was also wounded by gunfire during the incident. This incident was
particularly tragic, because it resulted in a fatality. By letter dated
September 22, 2010, in response to this incident, the BLET requested
that FRA require the use of door locks on locomotive cab doors. Under
current industry practice, many locomotive cab doors are not locked.
According to BLET's letter, requiring the use of door locks would
impede unauthorized access to the locomotive cab and reduce the risk of
violence to the train crew when confronted by a potential intruder. FRA
solicits comments regarding the impact that a locked door would have on
train crew safety. More specifically, FRA poses the following questions
regarding existing locomotive doors:
Can a door lock be broken when struck by a heavy, solid
object like a baseball bat, sledge hammer, or crowbar?
Can a door lock be broken by gunfire?
If a keyed lock is used, is it possible that the lock can
be picked by an unauthorized person?
If a keyed lock is used, is it possible for the key to be
lost, stolen, or duplicated without authorization?
If the door is locked, can a potential intruder gain
access to the cab by breaking through the door's window?
If the door is locked, can gunfire penetrate the door's
window, the door itself, or another portion of the car body?
In addition, FRA requests comments regarding the potential
effectiveness of using different locking mechanisms to secure the
locomotive cab. A portion of the industry is currently equipping new
locomotives with dead-bolt door locks. Door locks with quick release
mechanisms, keyed locks, and biometric locks could also potentially be
used to secure a locomotive cab. FRA seeks comments regarding the
potential benefits and concerns for each type of locking mechanism. FRA
also requests information concerning the effect of door locks during
emergency situations requiring rapid and easy evacuation of the
locomotive compartment or rescue access. After an accident or other
life threatening situation, a train crew may need to quickly exit a
locomotive cab, particularly in the event of a fire or a hazardous
materials release, and a train crew may require assistance from
emergency responders when injured or incapacitated. To help solicit an
abundance of information, FRA poses the following questions:
To what extent will the use of a door lock to secure the
locomotive cab hinder rapid and easy egress of the train crew?
If keyed locks are used, should emergency responders be
given keys?
To what extent will emergency responders' access to the
cab be unduly delayed by door locks?
Will door locks prohibit emergency responders' access to
the cab when the crew is incapacitated?
How can locomotive cab doors be secured without hindering
the crews' ability to egress rapidly and easily or emergency
responders' ability to gain access without undue delay?
FRA also requests information related to the costs associated with
installing and maintaining various locomotive cab locking mechanisms.
More specifically, for existing locomotives how many do not have
locking mechanisms? And, what type of locking device would be the most
cost effective to install and maintain and also adequately address the
three safety needs described above. Finally, are there any locomotives
in the US (existing or new) that would be particularly difficult or
expensive to equip with a locking mechanism? If so, which locomotives
are they, and how many of these locomotives exist? FRA also requests
comment as to how many locomotives are currently being manufactured for
domestic service with these devices? If FRA decides to establish a
uniform cab securement requirement for new locomotives, what type of
locking mechanism is recommended, and why? Finally, how much would such
a locking mechanism cost to install and maintain on new and existing
locomotives?
VI. Section-by-Section Analysis
This section-by-section analysis of the proposed rule is intended
to explain the rationale for each section of the proposed rule. The
analysis includes the requirements of the proposal, the purpose that
the proposal would serve in enhancing locomotive safety, the current
industry practice, and other pertinent information. The proposed
regulatory changes are organized by section number. FRA seeks comments
on all proposals made in this NPRM.
A. Proposed Amendments to Part 229 Subparts A, B, and C
Section 229.5 Definitions
This section contains a set of definitions to be introduced into
the regulation. FRA intends these definitions to clarify the meaning of
important terms as they are used in the text of the proposed rule. The
proposed definitions are carefully worded in an attempt to minimize the
potential for misinterpretation of the rule. The definition of alerter
introduces an unfamiliar term which requires further discussion.
``Alerter'' means a device or system installed in the locomotive
cab to promote continuous, active locomotive
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engineer attentiveness by monitoring select locomotive engineer-induced
control activities. If fluctuation of a monitored locomotive engineer-
induced control activity is not detected within a predetermined time, a
sequence of audible and visual alarms is activated so as to
progressively prompt a response by the locomotive engineer. Failure by
the locomotive engineer to institute a change of state in a monitored
control, or acknowledge the alerter alarm activity through a manual
reset provision, results in a penalty brake application that brings the
locomotive or train to a stop. For regulatory consistency FRA is
proposing the same definition as the one provided in part 238. FRA
intends for a device or system that satisfies an accepted industry
standard including, but not limited to, AAR Standard S-5513,
``Locomotive Alerter Requirements,'' dated November 26, 2007, to
constitute an alerter under this definition.
New definitions for terms related to remote control locomotives are
also being proposed. The proposed terms, ``Assignment Address,''
``Locomotive Control Unit,'' ``Operator Control Unit,'' ``Remote
Control Locomotive,'' ``Remote Control Operator,'' and ``Remote Control
Pullback Protection'' are common to the industry. On February 14, 2001,
FRA published a Safety Advisory in which FRA issued recommended
guidelines for conducting remote control locomotive operations. See 66
FR 10340, Notice of Safety Advisory 2001-01, Docket No. FRA-2000-7325.
The Safety Advisory includes definitions for each of the proposed
terms. FRA's proposed definitions for these terms are informed by the
Safety Advisory and Working Group discussions.
``Controlling locomotive'' means a locomotive from where the
operator controls the traction and braking functions of the locomotive
or locomotive consist, normally the lead locomotive. This proposed
definition is being added to help identify which locomotives are
required to be equipped with an alerter, and when the alerter is
required to be tested.
Section 229.7 Prohibited Acts and Penalties
Minimal changes are being proposed in this section to update the
statutory reference and the statutory penalty information.
Section 229.15 Remote Control Locomotives
After working with the railroad industry for many years to provide
a framework for the safe use, development, and operation of remote
control devices, FRA proposes to formally codify safety standards for
remote control operated locomotives. For convenience, FRA proposes to
divide the section into two headings: Design and operation, and
inspection and testing.
Generally, the proposed design and operation requirements are
intended to prevent interference with the remote control system,
maintain critical safety functions if a crew is conducting a movement
that involves the pitch and catch of control between more than one
operator, tag the equipment to notify anyone who would board the cab
that the locomotive is operating remote control, and bring the train to
a stop if certain safety hazards arise. The proposed inspection and
testing requirements are intended to ensure that each remote control
locomotive would be tested each time it is placed in use, and ensure
that the operator is aware of the testing and repair history of the
locomotive. It is FRA's understanding that virtually all railroads that
operate remote control locomotives have already adopted similar
standards, and that they have proven to provide consistent safety for a
number of years.
Section 229.19 Prior Waivers
FRA proposes to update the language in Sec. 229.19 to address the
handling of prior waivers of requirements in part 229 under the
proposed rule. A number of existing waivers are incorporated into the
proposed rule, others may no longer be necessary in light of the
proposal. The proposal allows railroads the opportunity to assert that
their existing waiver is necessary, and should be effective after the
proposed rule is adopted.
On February 28, 2007, in a notice, FRA proposed the sunset of
certain waivers granted for the existing locomotive safety standards.
72 FR 9059. The proposal urged grantees to submit existing waivers for
consideration for renewal in light of potential revisions to the
regulation, and explained FRA's interest in treating older waivers
consistently with newer waivers that were limited to five years. The
five year limitations were issued as far back as March of 2000. The
notice also established a docket to receive waivers for consideration.
In addition, the notice discussed the possibility of requiring
current grantees to re-register waivers. To streamline the process,
FRA's proposal does not include a re-registration requirement.
Section 229.20 Electronic Record-keeping
As explained in proposed paragraph (a), FRA would establish
standards for electronic record-keeping that a railroad may elect to
utilize to comply with many of the record-keeping provisions contained
in this part. As with any records, replacing a paper system that
requires the physical filing of records with an electronic system and
the large and convenient storage capabilities of computers, will result
in greater efficiency. Increased safety will also result, as railroads
will be able to access and share records with appropriate employees and
FRA quicker than with a paper system. To be acceptable, electronic
record-keeping systems must satisfy all applicable regulatory
requirements for records maintenance with the same degree of confidence
as is provided with paper systems. The proposed requirements would be
consistent with a series of waivers that FRA has granted since April 3,
2002 (Docket Number FRA-2001-11014), permitting electronic record-
keeping with certain conditions intended to ensure safety. In this
proposed section, FRA is adopting the Working Group's consensus
regulatory text for electronic record-keeping that was approved and
recommended to FRA by the RSAC on September 10, 2009. The proposed
standards are organized into three categories: (1) Design requirements,
(2) operational requirements, and (3) availability and accessibility
requirements.
(b) Design requirements. To properly serve the interest of safety,
records must be accurate. Inspection of accurate records will reveal
compliance or non-compliance with Federal regulations and general rail
safety practices. To ensure the authenticity and integrity of
electronic records it is important that security measures be in place
to prevent unauthorized access to the data in the electronic record and
to the electronic system. Proposed paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(5) are
intended to help secure the accuracy of the electronic records and the
electronic system by preventing tampering, and other forms of
interference, abuse, or neglect.
(c) Operational requirements. Proposed paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2)
are intended to utilize the improved safety capabilities of electronic
systems. The requirements of paragraph (c)(1) would cover both
inspection and repair records. In situations when the Hours of Service
laws would potentially be violated, the electronic system would be
required to prompt the person to input
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the data as soon as he or she returns to duty.
(d) Access and availability requirements. To properly serve the
interest of safety, the electronic records and the electronic record-
keeping system must be made available and accessible to the appropriate
people. FRA must have access to the railroads' electronic records and
limited access to the electronic record-keeping systems to carry out
its investigative responsibilities. During Working Group discussions, a
member representing railroad management explained that his railroad
currently can produce an electronic record within ten minutes, but that
a paper record may take up to two weeks. As such, the proposal provides
up to fifteen days to produce paper copies and requires that the
electronic records will be provided upon request.
Section 229.23 Periodic Inspection: General
This section would require railroads that choose to maintain and
transfer records as provided for in proposed Sec. 229.20, to print the
name of the person who performed the inspections, repairs, or certified
work on the Form FRA F 6180-49A that is displayed in the cab of each
locomotive. This would allow the train crew to know who did the
previous inspection when they board the locomotive cab.
Section 229.25 Test: Every Periodic Inspection
Two additional paragraphs are proposed in this section to include
inspection requirements for remote control locomotives and locomotive
alerters during the 92-day periodic inspection. FRA is proposing new
regulations for remote control locomotives, see proposed Sec. 229.15,
and locomotive alerters, see proposed section Sec. 229.140. For
convenience, the maintenance for remote control locomotives and
locomotive alerters that would properly be conducted at intervals
matching the 92-day periodic inspection, are being incorporated into
this section. The existing paragraphs would also be reorganized for
convenience.
Section 229.27 Annual Tests
FRA proposes to amend this section by deleting the following
existing language from paragraph (b): ``The load meters shall be
tested'' from paragraph (b). The modification would clarify the
regulatory language to reflect the current understanding and
application of the load meter requirement. FRA issued a clarification
for load meters on AC locomotives on June 15, 1998. In a letter to GE
Transportation Systems in March 2005, FRA issued a similar
clarification of the requirements related to testing load meters on DC
locomotives. The letter explained that on locomotives that are not
equipped with load meters there are no testing requirements. Similarly,
if a locomotive is equipped with a load meter but is using a proven
alternative method for providing safety, and no longer needs to
ascertain the current or amperage that is being applied to the traction
motors, there are no testing requirements for the dormant load meter.
Load meters have been eliminated or deactivated on many locomotives
because the locomotives are equipped with thermal protection for
traction motors and no longer require the operator to monitor
locomotive traction motor load amps.
FRA also proposes removing existing paragraph (a) from this section
and merging it into the brake requirements contained in proposed Sec.
229.29. Proposed Sec. 229.29 concerns brake maintenance, and as
discussed below, would be reorganized by this proposal to consolidate
all existing locomotive brake maintenance into one regulation.
Section 229.29 Air Brake System Calibration, Maintenance, and Testing
This section would be re-titled, and existing requirements would be
consolidated and better organized to improve clarity. Because proposed
Sec. 229.29 concerns only brakes, it would be re-titled, ``Air Brake
System Calibration, Maintenance, and Testing'' to more accurately
reflect the section's content. Existing Sec. 229.27(a), which also
addresses brake maintenance would be integrated into this section for
convenience and clarity. Record-keeping requirements for this section
would be moved from existing paragraphs (a) and (b) and merged into a
single new proposed paragraph (g). The date of air flow method (AFM)
indicator calibration would also be required to be recorded and
certified in the remarks section of Form F6180-49A under paragraph (g).
The proposed brake maintenance in this section would extend the
intervals at which required brake maintenance is performed for several
types of locomotive brake systems. The length of the proposed intervals
reflects the results of studies and performance evaluations related to
a series of waivers starting in 1981 and continuing to present day.
Overall, the type of brake maintenance that would be required would
remain the same. The current regulation provides for two levels of
brake maintenance. Existing Sec. 229.27(a) requires routine
maintenance for filters and dirt collectors, and brake valves. Existing
Sec. 229.29(a) requires maintenance for certain brake components
including parts that can deteriorate quickly and pieces of equipment
that contain moving parts. To better tailor the maintenance
requirements to the equipment needs and based on information
ascertained from various studies and performance evaluations, filters
and dirt collector maintenance would be required more frequently than
brake valve maintenance. As a result, the proposal provides for three
levels of brake maintenance instead of two.